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This paper explores how organizations respond to simultaneous institutional influences from two distinct sources: theindustry in which they operate and the local geographic community in which they are headquartered. We theorize
that the existence of institutional equivalents—other organizations at the same intersection of different fields, such as the
same industry and the same community—provides a clear and well defined reference category for firms and thus shapes
which subset of peers the focal organization imitates most closely. We develop hypotheses about how the presence or
absence of institutional equivalents affects organizations’ responses to behavioral cues from different peer groups, how
these effects vary when peers in different fields exhibit inconsistent behaviors, and how organizational characteristics,
such as size and performance, strengthen or weaken the influence of institutional equivalents. We test our propositions
through a longitudinal analysis of philanthropic contributions by Fortune 1000 firms from 1980 to 2006. Our framework
illuminates how simultaneous presence in multiple fields affects organizations and introduces to institutional theory the
concept of institutional equivalence, which we argue is a critical factor in determining how organizations respond to
multiple institutional cues.
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Introduction
A classic insight of institutional theory is that organiza-
tions look to their peers for cues to appropriate behav-
ior (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Yet recent studies have
shown that organizations are often embedded in more than
just one institutional field, settings where they “partake
of a common meaning system and 0 0 0 interact more fre-
quently and fatefully with one another than with actors
outside the field” (Scott 2001, p. 84). Thus, organiza-
tions often receive behavioral cues from more than one
set of peers (Greenwood et al. 2011) and experience
“multiple institutional prescriptions projected by different
audiences” (Greenwood and Meyer 2008, p. 263). The
juxtaposition of these two insights raises a fundamental
question: When organizations are embedded in multiple
institutional fields, which set of peers do they imitate, and
what factors shape their response to such situations?
How do organizations respond, for example, when
they are simultaneously exposed to cues from peers in
their industry (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Palmer et al.
1993) and cues from peers in their geographic community
(Freeman and Audia 2006, Lounsbury 2007, Marquis and
Battilana 2009)? Although simultaneous embeddedness
in industries and geographic communities is a ubiquitous
and enduring situation, limited research has examined
its consequences. While fields may maintain stability in
the face of multiple institutional influences (Dunn and
Jones 2010, Reay and Hinings 2009), the implications
of permanent embeddedness in more than one field have
remained largely unexamined. Much prior work on mul-
tiple institutional influences has focused instead on tem-
porary conflicts between different behavioral cues, often
exploring processes of institutional transitions within a
single field (e.g., Thornton and Ocasio 1999, Scott et al.
2000). Related research suggests that organizations in
such situations might, for example, ignore one or both
peer groups (Oliver 1991), relate independently to each of
them (Davis and Greve 1997), balance inconsistent influ-
ences through compromise (Rowan 1982), or combine
different cues into a hybrid organization (Battilana and
Dorado 2010, Pache and Santos 2013). To date, however,
most scholars have only speculated about the contingen-
cies that shape how organizations navigate their enduring
presence in multiple fields (Kraatz and Block 2008, Pache
and Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011).
To advance scholarship in this area, we propose that
a critical factor shaping the behavior of an organization
embedded in multiple fields is whether it occupies the
intersection of the different fields alone or shares it with
institutional equivalents, that is, other organizations that
exist at the same intersection (e.g., other firms embedded
in both the same industry and the same geographic com-
munity). We theorize that the presence (versus absence)
of institutional equivalents shapes which subset of peers
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the focal organization imitates most closely and how it
responds when its peers in different fields exhibit incon-
sistent behaviors. When institutional equivalents exist,
they serve as an obvious reference category of peers
that the focal organization is likely to imitate especially
closely, while paying relatively less attention to peers
with which it shares only a single field. Furthermore,
when the contrast between the behavior of peers in the
different fields is greater, firms experience more uncer-
tainty and so will be even more likely to follow their
institutional equivalents. In contrast, organizations with-
out institutional equivalents—those in an institutionally
unique position—will simultaneously attend to the dif-
ferent behavioral cues from distinct fields. Finally, we
further unpack the effect of institutional equivalents by
considering how their influence varies depending on two
basic characteristics of the focal organization: size and
performance.
We elaborate and test these arguments in the context
of corporate philanthropy in the United States between
1980 and 2006. This setting offers two major advan-
tages. First, unlike practices that are specific to a particu-
lar set of industries, corporate philanthropy is an activity
that any firm might engage in, which allows us to make
meaningful comparisons across a wide range of indus-
tries. Second, this is a setting in which the simultaneous
influence of industry and community institutional cues is
clear and readily analyzable. While research has indicated
that institutional influences from a firm’s focal industry
are key to understanding philanthropic actions (Wolch
1995, Brammer and Millington 2005), the literature also
highlights the effect of local environments on corporate
philanthropy (Marquis et al. 2007, Tilcsik and Marquis
2013). Thus, when making decisions about philanthropy,
“firms not only benchmark against other firms within their
industry, but also against other [firms], particularly those
within their local geographic context” (Bertels and Peloza
2008, pp. 60–61). Little is known, however, about how
firms respond to these two distinct institutional influences,
and which set of peers—and under what conditions—has
a greater influence on their philanthropic giving.
By developing a more nuanced theory of how simul-
taneous presence in multiple fields affects organizations,
we introduce the concept of institutional equivalence and
elaborate how and why it is key to understanding the
common situation where firms are embedded in multi-
ple fields. Our theory and findings suggest that, without
considering institutional equivalents, research on mimetic
isomorphism that only considers the effects of single
fields may be incomplete and potentially misspecified.
Furthermore, as we elaborate in the discussion, while our
focus is on firm position vis-à-vis two distinct fields, our
arguments also have more general implications for under-
standing peer imitation processes, particularly as firms
face increasingly multifaceted institutional environments.
Institutional Fields and
Corporate Philanthropy
It is well established that firms are more likely to fol-
low practices that peers in their field have adopted
(Palmer et al. 1993, Rao et al. 2001). In particular, prior
research has shown that industry (Scott 2001, Wooten
and Hoffman 2008, Raffaelli et al. 2013) and community
(Warren 1967, Marquis et al. 2013) peers are the most
crucial set of referents for understanding institutional
influences on firms. For instance, a number of empirical
studies have measured firms’ fields as common industry
membership and found that such fields affect the adop-
tion of important organizational features, such as struc-
tural form (Fligstein 1985), business strategy (Deephouse
1996), organizational name (Glynn and Abzug 2002), and
social responsibility practices (Raffaelli and Glynn 2014).
Furthermore, research has also shown that even in today’s
global environment, firms with the same headquarters
city remain a crucial peer group for firms (Marquis and
Battilana 2009). Community embeddedness, for exam-
ple, affects corporate governance (Davis and Greve 1997,
Kono et al. 1998), strategy (Lounsbury 2007), and the
establishment of new organizations (Almandoz 2012,
Audia et al. 2006).
Less understood are the implications of organizations’
enduring embeddedness in multiple different fields (Davis
2010). While theorists have called for understanding mul-
tidimensional institutional influences on organizations
(Friedland and Alford 1991, Thornton et al. 2012), these
studies havemainly looked within a single field and exam-
ined the mechanisms that allow for fields with multiple
institutions to maintain stability (Dunn and Jones 2010,
Purdy and Gray 2009, Reay and Hinings 2009). For exam-
ple, the institutions of care and science are typically in
conflict but can coexist in the field of medical education
because each is supported by distinct groups and inter-
ests (Dunn and Jones 2010). In contrast, simultaneous
behavioral cues from different fields are ongoing and per-
sistent, so organizations embedded in more than one field
continuously face uncertainty about which set of peers
to imitate, and the mechanisms of how they address this
situation are yet to be uncovered.
The case of corporate philanthropy illustrates this
ongoing uncertainty due to different behavioral cues from
distinct fields. Research has suggested that firms imitate
both industry and community peers when setting the level
of their philanthropic contributions. For example, qualita-
tive and survey-based studies have found that most firms
gather information about industry peers’ charitable activ-
ities (Siegfried et al. 1983, Bertels and Peloza 2008), and
that peer company comparisons are an important factor
when companies make decisions about their philanthropic
budgets (Useem and Kutner 1986) and other corporate
social practices (Raffaelli and Glynn 2014). Likewise,
research shows that the charitable giving of locally head-
quartered corporations is embedded in community-based
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social relationships and that local expectations signifi-
cantly influence firms’ social engagement (Bertels and
Peloza 2008, Galaskiewicz 1997, Marquis et al. 2007).
For example, in the “urban grants economy” of the Twin
Cities, Galaskiewicz (1997) found that locally headquar-
tered companies exerted significant influence on one
another to support local nonprofits. As executives inter-
viewed by Bertels and Peloza (2008, pp. 62–63) put it,
“We take our cues from the other big companies in town”
and “when we look around at how we can get involved,
we do so on a city-wide basis. We look to see who is set-
ting the standard and set that as our goal.” These different
peer groups, however, sometimes send different signals
about the appropriate level of giving, creating uncertainty
about whom to imitate.
While research has shown that strategic considera-
tions—particularly about the firm’s reputation and legit-
imacy with customers and various other stakeholders—
influence philanthropy (see McWilliams and Siegel
2001), there is no simple calculus for determining the
“right” level of corporate giving, and there is often a
great deal of uncertainty about the appropriate amount
of philanthropy (Bertels and Peloza 2008). The exis-
tence of this uncertainty likely accentuates the common
fault line within firms between financially oriented and
socially orientated employees (Almandoz 2014, Battilana
and Dorado 2010, Pache and Santos 2013). When it is
unclear which benchmark or standard should be followed,
“each manager is left to his or her own devices to deter-
mine how much 0 0 0 [philanthropy] is ‘enough’ ” (Bertels
and Peloza 2008, p. 64), and this may be a source of
contention within firms. Prior research has suggested that
differences in philanthropic motivations of actors within
an organization can generate internal conflict and affect
firms’ philanthropic decision making (Hemingway and
Maclagan 2004, Marquis and Lee 2013). As a result of
this uncertainty and how it affects internal firm dynamics
and decision making, the degree of corporate charitable
contributions varies greatly even among equally large and
profitable firms (Galaskiewicz 1997, Useem 1988, Tilcsik
and Marquis 2013).
Institutional Equivalence
The theory we develop focuses on how and why insti-
tutional equivalents—organizations that are embedded in
the same set of fields—are the primary reference group for
a firm when making decisions about philanthropic giving.
While prior research has tended to focus on only one set
of peers—for example, those in either the firm’s industry
or its community—we argue that looking at the overlap
of multiple institutional fields may help better differenti-
ate which organizations are actually seen as the relevant
reference group for a firm. Institutional equivalents serve
this exemplar role for other firms, not because of their
specific organizational characteristics, but because, given
the similarity of their institutional position with the focal
organization, they are exposed to a similar set of institu-
tional cues. As Greve (2005, p. 1032), noted “even when
no social tie is present, [organizational] actors may watch
and imitate each other because they view the other …as
being in a similar environment.” We argue that this kind
of imitation based on a shared or similar environment is
likely to be particularly important with regard to institu-
tional equivalents, as these are peers with which a firm
shares not one but multiple institutional environments.1
In our context, two firms are institutional equivalents
if they operate in the same industry and are headquar-
tered in the same geographic community—that is, if they
are industry peers that are also local geographic peers.
A long-standing line of research has examined specific
local industrial clusters (Romanelli and Khessina 2005)
as distinct institutional environments that may affect firm
behavior. For example, there is evidence that as the high-
technology industry developed, high-tech firms in Boston
were more influenced by peers that were both in the same
community and in the same industry than by high-tech
firms headquartered in other locations (Saxenian 1994).
And similar processes have been shown for automakers in
Detroit (Klepper 2007), tire makers in Akron (Sull 1999),
and biotechnology firms in Boston (Owen-Smith and
Powell 2004). While these case studies of local industrial
clusters are suggestive of the importance of institutional
equivalents, this research has not developed the idea that
having similar peers at the industry–community overlap
is a generalizable phenomenon—one that has relevance
for all firms, not just those in industrial districts. It also
has not considered the possibility that, as we hypothesize
below, the existence of institutional equivalents affects
the extent to which firms imitate their other industry or
community peers.
We argue that the presence or absence of institutional
equivalents powerfully shapes an organization’s response
to uncertainty that results from potentially inconsistent
behavioral cues from different sets of peers. As noted,
when institutional equivalents exist, they will serve as an
obvious reference category of imitable peers, implying
that the focal organization will pay relatively little atten-
tion to other industry peers (i.e., those headquartered in
different communities) and other community peers (i.e.,
those that operate in a different industry). Instead, orga-
nizations in such a position will likely be particularly
influenced by peers in a third reference category: their
institutional equivalents, which provide a clear reference
category, thereby reducing uncertainty about where to
look for appropriate behaviors.
This prediction is consistent with research on cognitive
categorization, which has shown that similarity on mul-
tiple dimensions, rather than just a single dimension, is
a critical variable influencing whether managers perceive
another organization as part of their firm’s peer group
(e.g., Lant and Baum 1995). The idea that institutional
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Figure 1 Illustrative Example of Institutional Equivalence: Bank of America’s Peers in Its Industry (Commercial Banks) and
Geographic Community (Charlotte) in 2006
Duke Energy (utilities)
Nucor (metals)
Sonic (automotive)
Goodrich (aerospace)
Wachovia
Citigroup (NYC)
J.P. Morgan Chase (NYC)
Wells Fargo (San Francisco)
U.S. Bancorp (Minneapolis)
Capital One (Richmond)
National City Corp. (Cleveland)
Bank of New York (NYC)
PNC Financial (Pittsburgh)
BB&T Corp. (Winston-Salem)
Fifth Third Bancorp (Cincinnati)
SPX (electronics)
Ruddick (food and drug stores)
Belk (department stores)
Carlisle (diversified mfg.)
Industry peers
Lowe’s (home improvement)
Family Dollar Stores (disc. retailer)
Community peers
Note. The 10 largest industry peers and the 10 largest community peers (by revenue) are shown.
equivalents constitute an especially influential reference
group also dovetails with the general sociological obser-
vation that social actors tend to interact with, and are
most likely to be influenced by, other actors who are like
themselves along multiple dimensions (see Moody 2001,
Block and Grund 2014).
Consider, for example, the situation of Bank of Amer-
ica in 2006, the last year in our empirical observation
period. As Figure 1 shows, Bank of America had numer-
ous peers in the banking industry located in other geo-
graphic communities. And it had several community peers
in the Charlotte, North Carolina, metropolitan area that
operated in other industries. But, at the time, it also had a
clear institutional equivalent—another major bank head-
quartered in Charlotte: Wachovia. Our theory suggests
that, in that period, Bank of America was most likely to
take cues from Wachovia, rather than its other industry
or community peers. Indeed, press accounts indicate a
special relationship between the two firms, as the com-
bination of a shared industry and a shared community
seems to have created both motivation and opportunity to
“monitor each other obsessively” (Hankins 2007). Many
of the two firms’ executives, for example, lived “next door
to each other” and, as a former Bank of America executive
put it, attended the “same clubs, same parties, same every-
thing” (Fitzpatrick 2006). And, because of their position
in the same industry and community, there was a palpa-
ble sense of rivalry in both business and philanthropic
affairs, leading both firms to closely watch—and try to
match—each other’s moves in activities as diverse as sup-
port and sponsorship of sports teams and customer ser-
vice levels (Hankins 2007). As a result, for example, both
firms would “sponsor nearly every civic event in town”
(Fitzpatrick 2006), had directors on the boards of the very
same philanthropic organizations, and toggled with each
other “between being number one and two [in donations]
for United Way for years” (Hankins 2007).
Accordingly, based on our theorizing and examples
from prior research, we hypothesize that a firm’s insti-
tutional equivalents constitute an important and unique
reference category, which is likely to overshadow the
influence of industry-only and community-only peers.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The philanthropic contributions
of institutional equivalents have a greater influence on a
firm’s contributions than do the contributions of its other
industry or community peers.
Not all firms, however, have institutional equivalents;
some occupy an industry–community intersection alone.
Take, for example, U.S. Bancorp, another major bank,
in 2006. As Figure 2 shows, while U.S. Bancorp had a
number of industry peers, all of these were headquartered
in other cities, such as Charlotte, New York, and San
Francisco. And, though U.S. Bancorp also had numer-
ous community peers, they were all operating in differ-
ent industries, from airlines to wholesalers. Thus, as the
only major bank headquartered in the Twin Cities, U.S.
Bancorp was in an institutionally unique position at the
overlap of an industry and a local community. Unlike
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Figure 2 Illustrative Example of the Absence of Institutional Equivalents: U.S. Bancorp’s Peers in Its Industry (Commercial
Banks) and Geographic Community (Twin Cities) in 2006
St. Paul Travelers (insurance)
Target (discount retailer)
Citigroup (NYC)
J.P. Morgan Chase (NYC) 
Wells Fargo (San Francisco)
Bank of America (Charlotte)
Capital One (Richmond)
National City Corp. (Cleveland)
Bank of New York (NYC)
PNC Financial (Pittsburgh)
Fifth Third Bancorp (Cincinnati)
General Mills (consumer foods)
UnitedHealth Group (healthcare) 
Best Buy (electronics retail)
3M (diversified industrials) 
Supervalu (wholesalers, food)
Northwest Airlines (airlines)
CHS (wholesalers, food)
Medtronic (medical devices)
Wachovia (Charlotte)
Industry peers Community peers
Note. The 10 largest industry peers and the 10 largest community peers (by revenue) are shown.
prior research that has tended to look at either industry
peers (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983) or community
peers (e.g., Marquis and Battilana 2009), for such firms,
we expect that the standard peer effects previously shown
in the literature will simultaneously shape philanthropic
giving; that is, as described above, firms without institu-
tional equivalents are likely to follow both their industry
peers and their community peers—a fundamentally dif-
ferent imitation pattern than what we expect for firms with
institutional equivalents, which have a single obvious ref-
erence category to follow.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). If a firm has no institutional
equivalents, the philanthropic contributions of both (a) its
industry peers and (b) its local peers will be positively
related to its own contributions.
Institutional Equivalence and Inconsistent Behaviors
by Different Peer Groups
While research has suggested that both industry and com-
munity peers may be important sources of institutional
influence on a firm’s philanthropic behavior, less research
has examined situations where an organization’s peers in
different fields exhibit divergent behaviors. For example,
how do firms deal with situations when peers in one field
are setting their philanthropic contributions at a high level
while those in another field are keeping the level of their
donations low? In such situations, the focal firm experi-
ences inconsistent behavioral cues from different fields
and might face the challenge of accommodating multiple
peer influences at the same time.
While enduring embeddedness in multiple fields does
not necessarily imply that the cues arising from differ-
ent fields are always and necessarily in conflict (Besharov
and Smith 2014), prior research and historical evidence
suggest that industry and community peers frequently
provide inconsistent behavioral cues regarding philan-
thropic giving. This is, in part, because there is little
overall consensus about the appropriate level of corpo-
rate philanthropy. Indeed, some have even questioned the
appropriateness of any form of corporate giving. In an
influential essay in the New York Times Magazine, for
example, Milton Friedman (1970) forcefully argued that
corporations should eschew charitable donations. Accord-
ing to Friedman, and more recent commentators build-
ing on his arguments, philanthropy is a misdirection of
shareholder resources, and executives who have an inter-
est in philanthropy should make individual donations (see
Margolis and Walsh 2003). In contrast, others believe that
philanthropy generates both social and business benefits
and is a part of the corporate “social contract” (Porter and
Kramer 2002, Coady 2008).
In the absence of a clear overall consensus about
the appropriateness of philanthropy, there is signifi-
cant variation in this practice across communities and
industries. At the community level, for example, while
Galaskiewicz’s (1985, 1997) analyses show that philan-
thropic generosity is highly legitimate and expected from
all companies in the Twin Cities, the typical amount of
corporate contributions is substantially lower in many
other cities (Marquis et al. 2007). For example, in stark
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Figure 3 Variation in the Average Level of Corporate Philanthropy in Select Industries and Communities in 1994
Detroit, MI Birmingham, AL Columbus, OH San Francisco, CA Twin Cities, MN Charlotte, NC
BORDEN
(food products)
GENERAL MILLS
(food products)
COMERICA
(financial services)
AMSOUTH
(financial services)
BANK ONE
(financial services) LEVI STRAUSS
(clothing)
NORWEST
(financial services)
WACHOVIA
(financial services)
WEND<
6
(fast food)
KMART
(dept. stores)
CISCO
(computer
equipment)
DAYTON-
HUDSON
(dept. stores)
FAMILY DOLLAR
(dept. stores)
GM
(automotive)
HEALTHSOUTH
(hospitals)
MCKESSON
(pharmaceuticals)
NUCOR
(steel production)
BRU12
6
(grocery store)
LIMITED BRANDS
(fashion)
BEST BUY
(consumer
electronics)
0
Average giving in community
+1 +2o1o2
+2
0
+1
–1
o2
Av
er
ag
e 
gi
vin
g 
in
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ry
,
Notes. This illustrative graph depicts the location of select firms in a space determined by the average philanthropic giving per sales in
their community and in their industry (z-scores) in 1994 (the midpoint of our observation window). Thus, for example, firms in the upper-left
quadrant were in a relatively generous industry while being headquartered in a community with a relatively low standard level of corporate
giving. The graph provides no information about the level of giving by any of these individual firms; rather, it indicates the standard level
of giving in their focal industries and headquarters communities.
contrast to Minneapolis, many Silicon Valley companies
in the late 1990s were known as “cyber stingy,” espous-
ing an ideology of self-reliance that proscribed chari-
table donations (Elkind 2016). Similar variation in the
legitimacy of philanthropy occurs across industries as
well (Brammer and Millington 2005). For example, while
generous philanthropic giving has significant legitimacy
in commercial banking for historical and legal reasons
(Marquis et al. 2007), keeping charitable donations at a
low level is common in some other industries, for exam-
ple, those without direct consumer contact (Burt 1983).
To illustrate the inconsistent institutional cues that firms
might face with regard to corporate philanthropy, Figure 3
highlights variation in the average level of philanthropic
giving in select industries and communities in 1994, the
midpoint of our observation window. Looking from left
to right, it is clear that there is considerable variation
in the average level of giving across these cities, from
Detroit and Birmingham as the least generous corporate
communities to Minneapolis and Charlotte as the most
generous ones. Similarly, looking from top to bottom,
there is significant variation across industries, from the
most generous food product and banking firms to retailers
and manufacturers. As a result of these variations, many
firms are simultaneously embedded in a focal industry and
a headquarters community that may differ substantially
from each other in the standard level of corporate giving,
thus experiencing high–low or low–high combinations of
average industry and community giving. The question,
then, is how organizations respond to these frequently
divergent institutional cues.
Increased uncertainty is well known to play a critical
role in how and why organizations in a field imitate one
another (Cyert and March 1963, Haunschild and Miner
1997, Henisz and Delios 2001), and uncertainty created
by inconsistencies in institutional cues can put a strain
on organizations as they aim to determine the appropriate
response (Seo and Creed 2002). Similarly, Schneiberg and
Clemens (2006) suggest that field heterogeneity decreases
institutional effects. We argue that when there are incon-
sistent behavioral cues, the different peer groups will pull
the organization in different directions and so increase
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the uncertainty about how much giving is appropriate.
Research on social proof, in turn, suggests that when
there is greater uncertainty, firms rely especially heavily
on their most salient and legitimate reference group (Rao
et al. 2001). As we described above, when institutional
equivalents exist, they constitute a uniquely relevant set of
peers for imitation, and so when there is uncertainty due
to inconsistent signals in the industry and the community,
we predict that firms will be even more likely to imitate
their institutional equivalents.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The greater the difference be-
tween the philanthropic contribution levels of industry
peers and community peers, the greater the influence of
institutional equivalents on a firm’s contributions.
Institutional Equivalence and
Organizational Characteristics
Institutional equivalents do not affect all organizations
equally; the strength of their influence is likely to depend
on the characteristics of the focal organization. As Martin
(2003) emphasized, actors have different attributes that
make them more or less susceptible to the effects of
different fields, and the influence of the environment is
a function of both the environment and the character-
istics of the actors themselves. Likewise, institutional
scholars have recently called for research that examines
“organizational filters,” or how the “characteristics of the
organization 0 0 0make it particularly sensitive to certain
[institutional cues] 0 0 0 and less so to others” (Greenwood
et al. 2011, p. 319); that is, how do organizational charac-
teristics affect the extent to which firms rely on cues from
their peers?
We examine two fundamental organizational character-
istics that are likely to filter the influence of institutional
equivalents: the focal organization’s size and perfor-
mance. While these characteristics are well studied in
the organizational literature, less considered is the extent
to which they affect how closely an organization attends
to the behavior of its peers. Based on prior institutional
research, we argue that because large firms are more vis-
ible and so subject to greater scrutiny, they are more
likely than small firms to closely imitate their institu-
tional equivalents; conversely, higher-performing firms
have less motivation to learn from others and less of a
need to justify their decisions and so might be less likely
to follow their institutional equivalents closely.
Organizational Size. Considerable research suggests
that more visible organizations—frequently conceptual-
ized as larger organizations—are especially susceptible to
institutional influences (Greenwood et al. 2011). In par-
ticular, while being large sometimes insulates organiza-
tions from institutional effects (Greenwood and Suddaby
2006), in many cases it actually intensifies them because
it provides visibility and attracts greater attention from
institutional constituents and the media (King 2008,
Greenwood et al. 2011). In the context of corporate phi-
lanthropy, we believe that this latter process is more
likely. As prior work has shown, large firms receive
more scrutiny on their levels of giving (Brammer and
Millington 2006), are more likely to be targeted by
nonprofits for contributions (Galaskiewicz 1985), and
are more visible to the media and the general public
(McDonnell and King 2013). Thus, in the domain of cor-
porate philanthropy, large firms are often “visible exem-
plars” (Greenwood et al. 2011) and as such are more
responsive to institutional influences than are smaller
organizations. As a result, institutional cues from multi-
ple fields will likely pose a greater challenge for large,
highly visible firms, making them especially likely to look
to their institutional equivalents—their clearest and most
obvious reference group—for the legitimate response.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The larger the firm, the greater
the influence of institutional equivalents on its philan-
thropic contributions.
Organizational Performance. Conversely, it is well
established in the prior literature that organizations with
lower performance are more likely to imitate other firms,
presumably because underperforming firms have both
greater motivation to learn from others (Westphal and
Zajac 1994, Greve 1998) and a greater need to justify their
behaviors (see Deephouse 1996). Inspired by successful
examples, underperforming firms often attempt to imitate
the practices of other organizations (see Strang and Macy
2001).
Since institutional equivalents serve as a clear refer-
ence group for firms, these arguments suggest that their
behavior is especially likely to be followed by the low-
performing firms that are in search of the most appropri-
ate level of philanthropic contribution. High-performing
firms, in contrast, are less likely to have the same set of
uncertainties and so might pay attention to the cues from
others when determining their philanthropic behaviors.
Thus, while the literature has suggested that higher per-
forming firms are likely to donate more (Waddock and
Graves 1997), we argue that high performance also leads
firms to be less likely to imitate the donation behaviors of
their relevant peers.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). The higher the financial perfor-
mance of a firm, the weaker the influence of institutional
equivalents on its philanthropic contributions.
Data andMethod
Sample and Dependent Variable
To test our hypotheses, we studied the philanthropic con-
tributions of Fortune 1000 corporations in the United
States between 1980 and 2006, a period for which reliable
time-series data on the relevant measures were available.
Given that the largest several hundred firms are respon-
sible for the vast majority of total corporate giving in
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the United States (Coady 2008), this sample captures the
most critical segment of U.S. corporate philanthropy. We
collected data on philanthropic contributions from the
National Directory of Corporate Giving (Foundation Cen-
ter 1981–2007) for the years 1981 to 2007. These data
are available in even-numbered years. For each firm-year,
we recorded our dependent variable, corporate philan-
thropic contributions (CPC), as the total amount of grants
given to charity either through a foundation or directly by
the corporation. We log-transformed 4+15 this variable to
correct for skewed values.
Because our regression models used lagged indepen-
dent variables, the first year of usable observations for
the dependent variable (i.e., the focal firm’s giving) was
1982. Historical data on important financial control vari-
ables (such as annual sales or return on assets (ROA))
were occasionally unavailable, especially for firms that
were not publicly traded at the time.2 To confirm that the
missing data on the control variables did not affect the
conclusions of our hypotheses tests, we also estimated
alternative models without the controls (and hence with-
out the missing observations) and found that the results of
our hypothesis tests did not substantively change relative
to our main models.
Independent Variables
In line with the causal sequence implied by our frame-
work, we lagged all independent and control variables by
one year, with the exception of industry and community
peers’ CPC, which were lagged by two years because
CPC data were only available in even years. We defined
industry peers as Fortune 1000 firms in the same two-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code as the
focal firm. This definition is consistent with the standard
practice of defining “two businesses as unrelated if they
operate in different two-digit SIC codes” (Gertner et al.
2002, p. 2501; see Beckman and Haunschild 2002).3 Data
on the average CPC of industry peers in a given year
came from the National Directories of Corporate Giving
(log-transformed; +1).
We defined community peers as Fortune 1000 firms
headquartered in the same core-based statistical area
(CBSA) as the focal firm. A CBSA is “a core area con-
taining a large population nucleus, together with adjacent
communities having a high degree of economic and social
integration with that core” (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).
Using this definition, we calculated the average CPC of
community peers for each year (log-transformed; +1).
Given the above definitions of peer groups, we conceptu-
alized a firm’s institutional equivalents as its community
peers that were also simultaneously its industry peers.
To test H3, we created the variable industry–community
difference, defined as the absolute value of the difference
between industry peers’ giving and community peers’
giving. Conceptually, this variable captures the degree of
dissimilarity between industry and community peers’ lev-
els of philanthropy. Finally, following prior research, we
measured firm size as sales revenue (e.g., Marquis 2003)
and financial performance as return on assets (ROA)
(e.g., Ocasio 1999). We obtained these variables from
Compustat. To ease the interpretation of the regression
results involving interaction terms, we standardized our
industry–community difference, sales, and ROA variables.
Control Variables
To carefully control for unobserved factors, all analyses
included firm fixed effects, which controlled for all time-
invariant characteristics of organizations and the environ-
ment in which they existed during our time frame. Thus,
our approach effectively held constant all relevant differ-
ences that were stable during the observation period. In
addition, our models included year fixed effects, which
controlled for all shocks, trends, and events that had simi-
lar effects across firms, such as macroeconomic changes,
federal policy shifts, and general trends in philanthropy.
Moreover, we controlled for several time-variant fac-
tors that have been shown previously to affect corporate
philanthropy. In addition to sales and ROA, we controlled
for firm age, which we measured in logged years to avoid
collinearity problems when including year fixed effects.
We also controlled for the size of each relevant peer group,
defining local corporate density as the number of Fortune
1000 firms headquartered in the focal firm’s community,
and operationalizing industry density as the number of
Fortune 1000 firms in the same two-digit SIC code as the
focal firm in a given year. Furthermore, we controlled for
industry ROA (i.e., the average ROA of industry peers)
and real per capita income at the community level (com-
munity income)—indicators of the economic situation of
the two fields. These data were from Compustat and the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Statistical Approach
We organized our data in a pooled cross-sectional time-
series format. To account for multiple observations per
firm and to control for all (observed and unobserved)
time-invariant differences between firms, we used fixed-
effects models. Thus, our models controlled for all (even
unobserved) firm characteristics that were stable during
our observation period. Moreover, this approach allowed
us to eliminate any confounding due to stable factors that
affect both the CPC of the focal firm and the CPC of its
peers. For example, because the level of corporate giving
might have a stable tendency to be higher in consumer-
oriented industries than in business-to-business industries
(Lev et al. 2010), industry type could be a possible con-
found, affecting both the focal firm’s giving (i.e., the
dependent variable) and its industry peers’ giving (i.e., an
independent variable). In a fixed-effects model, however,
all such stable factors (from industry type to the enduring
political or religious orientation of a headquarters loca-
tion) are controlled for.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
A. Firms with institutional equivalents
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Corporate philanthropic contributions 1073 7041
2. CPC of institutional equivalents 1049 4034 0017
3. CPC of industry peers 1049 2032 0009 0013
4. CPC of local peers 1049 2051 0011 0024 0011
5. Age 1801 1208 0013 0012 0013 0013
6. Sales 5,536 13,222 0049 0015 0009 0017 0020
7. ROA 0005 0005 0000 0003 É0001 É0001 0001 0000
8. Industry ROA 0005 0003 É0003 0002 É0004 É0005 0006 É0003 0031
9. Community income 3401 801 0014 0012 0020 0040 0016 0020 É0000 É0005
10. Industry density 4103 2302 É0001 0012 0029 É0001 É0001 É0004 É0004 É0014 0003
11. Local corporate density 2903 2309 É0008 0005 É0010 É0002 É0010 É0008 0001 0007 É0029 É0014
B. Firms without institutional equivalents
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Corporate philanthropic contributions 1064 1007
2. CPC of industry peers 1043 3040 0010
3. CPC of local peers 1043 3068 0009 0007
4. Age 1801 1303 0009 0018 0012
5. Sales 4,640 9,785 0025 0014 0015 0026
6. ROA 0005 0005 0001 É0000 É0000 0001 0002
7. Industry ROA 0005 0003 É0001 0004 0000 0005 É0001 0010
8. Community income 3405 8016 0008 0012 0035 0010 0024 É0001 0000
9. Industry density 3108 2501 0001 0030 É0007 0001 É0002 É0003 É0005 É0004
10. Local corporate density 2008 3105 É0000 É0017 0018 É0004 É0000 0000 0005 0003 É0026
Notes. CPC and age were log-transformed for the purposes of regression analysis, but here we report means and standard deviations
for the original untransformed variables (in millions of dollars and in years, respectively). To facilitate interpretation, sales and ROA were
standardized for the purposes of regression analysis, but this table reports means and standard deviations for sales (in million dollars) and
ROA before standardization.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations appear in Table 1,
separately for firms that have institutional equivalents and
those that do not. To compare these two types of firms,
we conducted two-sample t-tests, which we corrected for
unequal variances where appropriate. The two samples
did not differ significantly in the average level of cor-
porate giving, age, ROA, industry ROA, and community
income. One statistically significant difference was that
firms with institutional equivalents tended to be some-
what larger (by approximately 20% in terms of sales, on
average; P < 00001). In addition, firms with institutional
equivalents had more industry and community peers on
average (P < 00001), which is not surprising, because
when the number of peers in the two fields is higher, there
is naturally a higher chance of having some overlapping
peers (i.e., institutional equivalents).
We test our hypotheses in Table 2. Focusing on firms
with institutional equivalents, model 1 predicts the focal
firm’s philanthropic contributions as a function of its var-
ious peer groups’ philanthropy and our control variables.
Unsurprisingly, this model shows that firm size, firm age,
and income level in the headquarters community are asso-
ciated with greater philanthropic giving. More important
for our purposes, this model provides evidence consistent
with H1. There is a statistically significant relationship
between the philanthropic giving of a firm’s institutional
equivalents and the firm’s own giving; other industry and
community peers, in contrast, do not have such an influ-
ence. This suggests that firms most closely follow their
institutional equivalents, if they have them, while giving
relatively little attention to cues from other industry and
community peers.
Specifically, model 1 estimates that a 1% increase
in institutional equivalents’ average giving is associated
with a roughly 0.12% subsequent increase in the focal
firm’s contributions, even when using a highly conserva-
tive modeling strategy with a two-year lag between the
dependent and independent variables, firm and year fixed-
effects, and a variety of control variables. As our tests
of H3–H5 show below, this relationship is even stronger
under certain conditions.
To explore how the situation differs when institutional
equivalents do not exist, the second column of Table 2
presents a model that is similar to model 1 but focuses
on firms without institutional equivalents. It shows that if
a firm has no institutional equivalents, the philanthropic
contributions of both its industry peers and its community
peers are positively related to its own charitable contribu-
tions. Thus, such firms have fundamentally different imi-
tation patterns than firms with institutional equivalents,
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Table 2 Hypothesis Tests: Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Corporate Philanthropic Contributions
Model 1 (H1) Model 2 (H2) Model 3 (H3) Model 4 (H4) Model 5 (H5)
CPC of institutional equivalents 0012⇤⇤⇤ 0014⇤⇤⇤ 0010⇤⇤⇤ 0012⇤⇤⇤
400025 400025 400025 400025
CPC of industry peers 0005 0019⇤⇤⇤ 0006 0005 0005
400045 400035 400045 400045 400045
CPC of community peers É0003 0011⇤⇤⇤ 0001 É0001 É0002
400055 400025 400055 400055 400055
CPC of institutional equivalents⇥ Industry–community difference 0008⇤
400035
CPC of institutional equivalents⇥Sales 0008⇤⇤⇤
400025
CPC of institutional equivalents⇥ROA É0006+
400035
Sales (standardized) 1023⇤⇤⇤ 0099⇤⇤⇤ 1024⇤⇤⇤ 0031 1023⇤⇤⇤
400235 400265 400235 400305 400235
ROA (standardized) É0020 0050 É0020 É0009 É0001
400205 400385 400205 400205 400235
Age 1002⇤⇤⇤ 0042+ 1001⇤⇤⇤ 1014⇤⇤⇤ 1002⇤⇤⇤
400215 400225 400215 400215 400215
Industry ROA 0045 É0073⇤ 0029 0019 0094
Community income 0005⇤ É0004 0005⇤ 0005⇤ 0005⇤
400025 400035 400025 400025 400025
Industry density É0001 0000 É0001 É0001 É0001
400015 400015 400015 400015 400015
Community density 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
400005 400015 400005 400005 400005
Industry–community difference (standardized) 0011
400185
Constant 0006 4022⇤⇤ É0078 É0050 0002
410495 410465 410625 410495 410495
Observations: firm-years (firms) 6,557 (1,788) 5,093 (1,442) 6,557 (1,788) 6,557 (1,788) 6,557 (1,788)
Note. All models include firm and year fixed effects.
+p < 0010; ⇤p < 0005; ⇤⇤p < 0001; ⇤⇤⇤p < 00001.
which have a single obvious reference category of peers.
This result provides support for H2.
The Contingent Effect of Institutional Equivalents
The last three models in Table 2 tests our hypotheses
about conditions under which the influence of institu-
tional equivalents is stronger or weaker (H3, H4, H5).
Model 3 is similar to model 1 but adds our industry–
community difference variable and its interaction with
CPC of institutional equivalents. According to H3, when
industry–community difference is high (i.e., when the
average levels of giving in the industry and the commu-
nity are dissimilar), we should see a particularly strong
effect of institutional equivalents on the focal firm’s giv-
ing. The results from model 3 are consistent with this
prediction. When industry–community difference is one
standard deviation below the mean (i.e., when the two
peer groups are quite similar in their giving behavior),
then institutional equivalents have only a weak effect;
a 1% increase in their contributions is associated with
a 0.06% (i.e., 0014É 0008 = 0006) increase in the focal
firm’s giving. However, when industry–community differ-
ence is one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., when
the two peer groups are quite different in their giving lev-
els), a 1% increase in institutional equivalent’s giving has
an effect that is more than three time as strong, leading
to a 0.22% (i.e., 0014+ 0008= 00225 increase in the focal
firm’s giving. Figure 4 plots this interaction effect. Thus,
consistent with H3, the greater the difference between
the philanthropic contribution levels of industry peers and
community peers, the greater the influence of institutional
equivalents on a firm’s contributions.
Model 4 tests H4, examining whether the influence of
institutional equivalents varies with the size of the focal
firm. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on the
interaction between CPC of institutional equivalents and
sales is positive and statistically significant, implying that
the larger the firm, the stronger the effect of institutional
equivalents on its philanthropic contributions. This rela-
tionship is depicted in Figure 5. This finding suggests that
large, highly visible organizations are especially likely to
look to their institutional equivalents.
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Figure 4 Industry–Community Difference, Institutional
Equivalents, and Philanthropy (H3)
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Finally, model 5 tests our hypothesis that the influence
of institutional equivalents is somewhat weaker for finan-
cially high-performing firms (H5). The coefficient on the
interaction term between ROA and the contributions of
institutional equivalents is positive and significant at the
10% level (two-way test), providing some evidence that
the higher the financial performance of a firm, the weaker
the influence of institutional equivalents on its philan-
thropic contributions. Figure 6 displays this relationship.
Supplementary Analyses: Firms Without
Institutional Equivalents
Though we did not hypothesize how industry–community
difference, firm size, and ROA might shape firms’ imita-
tion patterns in the absence of institutional equivalents,
we conducted supplementary analyses to explore this
question in Table 3. This analysis examines whether a
firm that has no institutional equivalents pays more or less
attention to its industry and community peers depending
on the difference between the two peer groups’ giving
Figure 5 Firm Size, Institutional Equivalents, and
Philanthropy (H4)
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Figure 6 Firm Performance, Institutional Equivalents, and
Philanthropy (H5)
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levels (models 6 and 7), firm size (model 8), and financial
performance (model 9).
Models 6 and 7 include interactions between industry–
community difference and industry peers’ giving (model 6)
and community peers’ giving (model 7). We included
these two interactions in separate regressions because
variance inflation factors indicated serious collinearity
problems when including these interactions in the same
model. Model 6 indicates that the lower the industry–
community difference (i.e., the more similar the level of
giving in the industry and the community), the stronger
the effect of industry peers. Similarly, model 7 shows
that the link between the CPC of community peers and
the focal firm’s giving is strongest when the level of
giving among community peers is consistent with the
level of giving among industry peers (i.e., when industry–
community difference is low). This suggests that—in
the absence of institutional equivalents—when different
fields give rise to inconsistent cues and pull the focal
organization in different directions, those dissimilar cues
might weaken one another. In contrast, it seems that when
the cues arising from different fields are in alignment with
one another (when industry–community difference is low),
organizations without institutional equivalents are partic-
ularly responsive to the mutually reinforcing cues from
their industry and community peers. In addition, model 8
suggests that in the absence of institutional equivalents,
larger firms are especially attentive to both their industry
peers and their community peers. Financial performance,
in contrast, has no significant bearing on the imitation of
either industry or community peers among firms in an
institutionally unique position (model 9).
Overall, our results suggest that when firms have insti-
tutional equivalents, they most closely follow this single
obvious reference group and are less likely to be affected
by the level of philanthropy among their other industry
and community peers. But the influence of institutional
equivalents is not uniform across all firms and situations;
it is particularly strong if inconsistent cues emerge from
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Table 3 Supplementary Analysis: Models Predicting Corporate Philanthropic Contributions
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
CPC of industry peers 0021⇤⇤⇤ 0021⇤⇤⇤ 0017⇤⇤⇤ 0019⇤⇤⇤
400035 400035 400035 400035
CPC of community peers 0009⇤⇤⇤ 0009⇤⇤⇤ 0010⇤⇤⇤ 0011⇤⇤⇤
400025 400025 400025 400025
CPC of industry peers⇥ Industry–community difference É0002⇤⇤⇤
400015
CPC of community peers⇥ Industry–community difference É0002⇤⇤⇤
400015
CPC of industry peers⇥Sales 0011⇤⇤⇤
400035
CPC of community peers⇥Sales 0011⇤⇤⇤
400025
CPC of industry peers⇥ROA 0003
400115
CPC of community peers⇥ROA É0002
400095
Sales (standardized) 0098⇤⇤⇤ 0096⇤⇤⇤ É1078⇤⇤ 0099⇤⇤⇤
400265 400265 400585 400265
ROA (standardized) 0051 0052 0053 0038
400385 400385 400385 410945
Age 0042 0041 0059⇤⇤ 0041
400225 400225 400235 400225
Industry ROA É0056 É0060 É0069⇤ É0073⇤
400345 400345 400345 400345
Community income É0005 É0005 É0005 É0004
400035 400035 400035 400035
Industry density É0000 É0000 0000 0000
400015 400015 400015 400015
Community density 0000 0000 0000 0000
400015 400015 400015 400015
Industry–community difference (standardized) 0019 0031
400195 400195
Constant 4031⇤⇤ 4000⇤⇤ 3086⇤⇤ 4023⇤⇤
410465 410465 410465 410465
Observations: firm-years (firms) 5,093 (1,442) 5,093 (1,442) 5,093 (1,442) 5,093 (1,442)
Note. All models include firm and year fixed effects.
⇤p < 0005; ⇤⇤p < 0001; ⇤⇤⇤p < 00001.
the focal firm’s industry and community, if the firm is a
large, visible organization, or if its financial performance
is relatively weak. In contrast, firms without institutional
equivalents are in a distinctly different situation. As they
lack a single obvious category of imitable peers, they pay
attention to both their industry peers and their community
peers, especially if the cues from those peer groups are
consistent, and if the focal firm is large. Taken together,
these findings suggest that organizations with and without
institutional equivalents exhibit fundamentally different
patterns of intraorganizational imitation, and that insti-
tutional equivalents—when they exist—constitute a criti-
cally important part of a firm’s institutional environment.
Discussion
Organizational theorists are increasingly interested in
understanding how organizations operate in multifaceted
environments composed of other organizations and
diverse institutional influences (Pache and Santos 2010,
Wry et al. 2013). Within institutional theory, while a sig-
nificant focus has been how and why an organization imi-
tates other organizations that operate in the same field,
more recent research has drawn attention to multiple insti-
tutional influences, highlighting the fact that many orga-
nizations are embedded in more than just one field.
Our study reveals the implications of this situation by
introducing the concept of institutional equivalence and
showing that when institutional equivalents exist, they
serve as an obvious reference category such that firms will
pay relatively little attention to other peers with which
they share only a single field. Furthermore, when the
behaviors of peers in the different fields diverge and so
firms experience more uncertainty, they are even more
likely to follow their institutional equivalents. In contrast,
organizations in an institutionally unique position lack
a single obvious reference group of imitable peers and
thus attend to behavioral cues from both their commu-
nity peers and their industry peers. Our supplementary
analyses further showed that when the behavioral cues
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from the different fields diverge, firms without institu-
tional equivalents are less likely to imitate the behavior of
either peer group. Finally, we further unpack the effect of
institutional equivalents by considering how their influ-
ence varies depending on two basic characteristics of the
focal organization and showing that larger size amplifies,
while stronger performance attenuates, the imitation of
institutional equivalents.
A crucial implication of our theory and findings is
that without identifying institutional equivalents, prior
literature may have overgeneralized or misspecified the
extent to which firms follow different types of peers. For
example, studies that examine either industry-based (e.g.,
Fligstein 1985) or community-based (e.g., Marquis 2003)
imitation typically only include the behavior of that one
set of peers. For instance, while Marquis (2003) argued
that new firms in a community imitated the board of direc-
tor structures of prominent local firms, he did not take
into account how this apparent attention to local peers
might be confounded by the imitation of industry peers or
the effect of institutional equivalents. Our findings sug-
gest that to properly identify effects of a focal group of
peers, researchers must not only identify that particular
group of peers, but also examine whether and how it over-
laps with other important peer groups; that is, institutional
equivalents represent a special and particularly influential
subset of peers, and this group cannot be identified with-
out examining the overlap of the different fields in which
the focal firm is embedded. And, when there is no such
overlap, because institutional equivalents do not exist, the
focal firm is all the more attentive to both fields. Thus,
without considering the influence of institutional equiv-
alents, research on mimetic isomorphism that only con-
siders the effects of single fields may be incomplete and
even potentially misleading.We call for future research on
interorganizational imitation that does not simply focus
on peers in a given field, but, rather, examines the wider
set of relevant and potentially overlapping peer groups.
The notion that organizations are especially attuned to
the behavior of their institutional equivalents also relates
to the idea, elaborated in the ecology literature, that firms
are most likely to imitate similar others (Haveman 1993,
Greve 1998). However, we emphasize a different dimen-
sion of similarity that shapes imitation patterns—location
at the same intersection of two fields. This dimension of
similarity is based not only on the strategic aspects of
a firm’s situation—such as firm size or market type—
but also on embeddedness in the same sociocultural con-
text of a local headquarters community (Marquis and
Battilana 2009). Thus, this type of similarity fosters imita-
tion of other firms whose institutional situation is similar
to the focal firm’s own. While scholars commonly recog-
nize that there is significant “heterogeneity in imitation”
(Greve 2000, p. 818) in the sense that not all firms are
equally likely to be imitated, research in this area has
typically focused on heterogeneity in imitation by firm
type (e.g., Haveman 1993; for a review, see Greve 2000)
or location (Marquis and Battilana 2009). In contrast, we
shed light on how the specific constellation of peer groups
that a firm has—and, in particular, whether those groups
are intersecting or not—affects imitation patterns.
In addition, our findings about the effects of size and
performance on how closely firms follow institutional
equivalents contributes to a greater understanding of how
organizational characteristics “filter” institutional cues
(Greenwood et al. 2011, Martin 2003). While the existing
literature has begun to consider how organizational filters
affect the adoption of different practices (e.g., Raffaelli
and Glynn 2014, Tilcsik 2010), it has not explored the
effect of organizational characteristics on how closely an
organization attends to the behavior of its peers. Our find-
ings regarding organizational performance illustrate why
this distinction is conceptually important. While research
suggests that better performing firms may donate more
(Waddock and Graves 1997), we hypothesize and show
that performance also leads firms to be less likely to imi-
tate the donation patterns of their peers. Thus, the previ-
ous focus on how filters affect the adoption of practices is
insufficient for understanding the organizational contin-
gencies of institutional processes (Greenwood et al. 2011,
Martin 2003). We encourage future research to continue
examining how organizational characteristics affect imi-
tation patterns.
While simultaneous embeddedness in an industry and
a geographic community is a ubiquitous organizational
condition, the concept of institutional equivalence also
has implications for other situations and thus contributes
to institutional theory more generally as well. For exam-
ple, as globalization proceeds, corporations with a wide
global spread might have several geographically based
reference groups in addition to peers in their industry and
their headquarters community (Kostova and Roth 2002).
This suggests that understanding effects of multiple ref-
erence groups on firms will be an increasingly impor-
tant topic from both theoretical and practical standpoints.
Furthermore, research has shown that firms’ virtual com-
munities are also potentially important sources of institu-
tional influences (Almandoz et al. 2016). Thus, in some
cases, institutional cues might emanate from three or even
more fields. The implications of our framework, how-
ever, remain the same: to understand how organizations
respond to such conditions, researchers must examine
whether a firm has institutional equivalents and whether
behavioral cues from the various fields are consistent or
divergent. Future research that directly explores this issue
could further elaborate our arguments and yield additional
insights.
Our framework might also apply to situations when
inconsistent institutional influences are presentwithin one
of the fields in which an organization operates. For exam-
ple, fields that are just emerging or undergoing a radical
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transformation—such as new industries or those experi-
encing significant flux—are often characterized by sharp
contestation between different institutions (Greenwood
et al. 2011). One idea that might emerge from our frame-
work is that the lack of a clear and unambiguous signal
about appropriate behaviors will render internally con-
tested fields less relevant, thus making internally stable
fields, or those that have reached a “settlement” (Rao and
Kenney 2008, Smets et al. 2012), relatively more impor-
tant in shaping the behavior of organizations. Further-
more, while our analysis did not focus on firms that faced
different institutional logics (Thornton et al. 2012), our
concept of institutional equivalence might be relevant to
understanding situations where firms face multiple log-
ics, and exploring such situations is an important step for
future work. For instance, within-field contestation about
multiple logics might attract more intense attention to a
field and hence increase its relative salience, or it might
increase uncertainty and thus make institutional equiva-
lents particularly important. These possible implications
of our theory deserve empirical attention at the within-
field level, and exploring how they affect situations where
multiple logics exist should help clarify the link between
conflicting institutional influences that are due to embed-
dedness in multiple fields and those that exist within a
field.
Boundaries, Limitations, and Future Research
As with any study, there are boundaries to our theoriz-
ing and limitations to our approach that we hope future
research will address. First, a reasonable question con-
cerns the extent to which our study of corporate philan-
thropy may generalize to other organizational activities.
In particular, corporate philanthropy has been shown to
be a relatively discretionary practice with questionable
financial impact (Margolis and Walsh 2003), and not typ-
ically driven by core business considerations (Marquis
and Lee 2013). Thus, one possible boundary condition is
that some aspects of our theory may apply particularly
well to discretionary practices. At the same time, other
studies have shown that even core business activities,
such as financing and market exit decisions, are sensitive
to similar institutional processes (Mizruchi et al. 2006,
Gaba and Terlaak 2013), suggesting that such effects may
apply more broadly. Furthermore, while philanthropy is
often seen as a largely local phenomenon (Galaskiewicz
1997), we note that many other organizational practices—
from firm strategy (Lounsbury 2007) to corporate gov-
ernance (Davis and Greve 1997, Marquis 2003)—have
also been shown to be powerfully influenced by local
peers. Future research, however, should examine poten-
tial boundary conditions to our theory, exploring different
types of organizational practices and their relationship to
different institutional environments.
In addition, we recognize the limitations of different
empirical approaches and acknowledge that our large-
scale, longitudinal, quantitative methods cannot provide
deep insight into the fine-grained microfoundations of the
patterns we uncovered. In particular, while we do see
imitation as a response to uncertainty about what is legit-
imate and appropriate in general and about how much
giving is “enough” in particular, we do not observe the
specific motivations behind these imitation processes. We
encourage more qualitative research into our questions,
in part to better understand the motivations behind insti-
tutional processes. Importantly, qualitative studies could
reveal the details of the within-organizational processes
whereby firms manage their embeddedness in multiple
fields (Almandoz 2014).
Furthermore, future work might examine situations
when one field versus the other may take precedence
for an organization because of certain characteristics of
the field or the organization (Zhang et al. 2016). Prior
research has suggested a number of community and
industry field characteristics that affect firms’ susceptibil-
ity to behavioral cues. For example, some communities
have a deeper tradition of localism (Marquis 2003), and
the presence of upper-class social clubs (Domhoff 2010,
Kono et al. 1998) and a vibrant nonprofit sector (Marquis
et al. 2007) may strengthen community effects. Studies
have also shown that isomorphism varies across differ-
ent industries (Galaskiewicz 1997, Lev et al. 2010) and
depends on factors such customer type (Burt 1983) and
level of industry concentration (Guillén 2002). We rec-
ommend further research into how different field-level
and organization-level characteristics affect the salience
of one field versus another.
Finally, with regard to our empirical context, future
research might examine the extent to which the drivers
of corporate philanthropy have changed over time and
how that may affect responses to multiple institutional
influences. In recent years, for example, there has been a
shift toward “strategic philanthropy” that targets “areas of
competitive context where the company and society both
benefit” (Porter and Kramer 2002, p. 58). We accounted
for such changes through our methods, including the use
of year fixed effects to capture broad trends, but we also
believe that one interesting future research effort would be
to explore how the changing motivation for philanthropy
might shape the imitation patterns we have explored.
Conclusion
Most organizations simultaneously exist in multiple fields
and face several institutional influences as a result. While
recent research has identified the importance of differ-
ent institutional forces on organizations, limited attention
has focused on how organizations address their enduring
embeddedness in multiple distinct fields, such as industry-
based fields and local communities. To understand this
ubiquitous situation, we have introduced the concept of
institutional equivalence and developed a framework that
considers the nature of the position that the focal orga-
nization occupies at the intersection of different fields.
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This framework provides a new lens for understanding
the consequences of embeddedness in multiple fields—
a pervasive organizational condition that merits further
study.
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Endnotes
1The concept of institutional equivalence is different from
structural equivalence. Structurally equivalent actors have
structurally identical relational patterns and positions in a net-
work (Mizruchi 1993). Institutional equivalence, on the other
hand, captures the similarity of institutional influences that
organizations experience from being in the same fields, regard-
less of how similar their network ties and positions are. For
example, two banks in Boston might have very different pat-
terns of ties (e.g., one may be a central node surrounded by a
dense network; the other may reside in a peripheral position
in a sparser network) such that they are far from being struc-
tural equivalents; yet, because they both operate in the field of
finance and in the same geographically defined field, they are
subject to some of the same institutional influences.
2Because new firms emerge and some old firms disappear over
time, this data set represents an unbalanced panel. A battery of
standard econometric tests using different selection variables
(Nijman and Verbeek 1992, Wooldridge 2002, Verbeek 2008)
indicated no selection bias due to this issue.
3Significant diversification across two-digit SIC codes was
uncommon during most of our period, and our results remained
substantively unchanged when we controlled for diversification
across two-digit SIC codes using the entropy measure (Davis
et al. 1994).
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